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Abstract
Mathematicians sometimes judge a mathematical proof to be beautiful and in
doing so seem to be making a judgement of the same kind as aesthetic judge-
ments of works of visual art, music or literature. Mathematical proofs are also
appraised for explanatoriness: some proofs merely establish their conclusions as
true, while others also show why their conclusions are true. This paper will focus
on the prima facie plausible assumption that, for mathematical proofs, beauty
and explanatoriness tend to go together.
To make headway we need to have some grip on what it is for a proof to be
beautiful, and for that we need some account of judgements of beauty in general.
That is the concern of the first section. The second section faces the problem
that it is far from obvious how abstract entities, such as mathematical proofs, can
be beautiful, strictly and literally speaking. Reasons are given for the view that
they can be. The third section introduces the distinction between proofs which
explain their conclusions and proofs which do not. Finally, the question whether,
for mathematical proofs, the beautiful and the explanatory tend to coincide is
addressed. It is argued that we have reason to doubt that explanatory proofs
tend to be beautiful, and insufficient reason to believe or disbelieve that beautiful
proofs tend to be explanatory.
Keywords: proof; explanation; beauty.
Mathematicians sometimes judge a mathematical proof to be beautiful and
in doing so seem to be making a judgement of the same kind as aesthetic
judgements of works of visual art or literature. Mathematical proofs are also
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appraised for explanatoriness: some proofs merely establish their conclusions
as true, while others also explain their conclusions. In this paper I first defend
the view that mathematical proofs are open to aesthetic evaluation and some
of them may be correctly judged beautiful. Then I assess the claim, brought
to my attention by Manya Raman-Sundstro¨m1, that, with regard to proofs,
beauty and explanatoriness tend to go together.
The paper is organised as follows. As a necessary framework for defending
the aptness of judgements of beauty in mathematics, Section 1 concerns
judgements of beauty in general. Section 2 concerns judgements of beauty
about mathematical proofs. Section 3 is about explanatory proofs. Section
4 assesses the claim that explanatory proofs are almost always beautiful and
vice versa. Then there is a short concluding section.
1. Judgements of Beauty
A judgement of beauty is often a response to pleasure we experience in
perceiving something, for instance a painting or a performance of some music.
But these judgements are not statements about ourselves, about our hedonic
states or our preferences. We allow that we can be corrected, either by being
alerted to aspects of the work we may have missed (or misappreciated) or by
instructive comparison with other works of the same genre. We allow that
other people may be better judges than we are, having a more developed
sensibility of the relevant kind, and that with further attentive experience
we may become better judges than we are now. But we do not allow that
others are better judges than we are about our own likes and dislikes. So a
strictly subjectivist view of ascriptions of beauty is wrong.
Also wrong is a certain kind of objectivist view. For to judge something
beautiful is not to attribute to it a property which is mind-independent.2
The judgement cannot be correct unless the thing has a propensity to give
significant pleasure to people with a developed sensibility of the relevant kind
from mentally apprehending it (e.g. in visual experience if it is a painting,
1Manya Raman-Sundstro¨m, “On Beauty and Explanation in Mathematics”, talk de-
livered at the conference Mathematical Cultures 2, De Morgan House, London, September
17–19, 2013.
2There are other senses of “objective”, see Chapter 2 of [3]. In some of these other
senses a judgement of beauty might be objective.
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in auditory experience if it is a performance of some music). I take this
connection of beauty to pleasure in mental apprehension to be essential to
beauty.
Though a thing cannot be beautiful unless it has a pleasure-giving propen-
sity, not any kind of pleasure will do. For example, the relevant kind of
pleasure does not result from satisfying or exciting an appetite, nor from an-
ticipating or imagining the satisfaction of an appetite, nor from one’s appre-
ciation of the object’s instrumental goodness in serving some goal, fulfilling
some function or promoting some (non- aesthetic) value.3 In short, for the
correctness of a judgement of beauty only disinterested pleasure is relevant.4
Also excluded are one-shot pleasures. However funny on first hearing, a
particular joke loses its power to please the more often one hears it; for this
reason jokes are not candidates for beauty. This is not so for fine musical
compositions; provided that the gaps between occasions when one listens to
some particular music are not too small, pleasure returns and often increases.
Something is beautiful, then, only if it has a propensity to give disinterested
repeatable pleasure.
It is well known that aesthetic judgements differ, and so do the degrees of
pleasure experienced by different people in mentally apprehending the same
thing. This divergence can be largely explained by a combination of three
factors. First, people are affected differently by different genres of things. If
works of a particular genre, say classical Chinese vocal solos, leave you cold
because of their generic character, then of course you will get no pleasure
from listening to any of them and you will not be in a good position to
compare one with another for aesthetic quality. Nonetheless some of them
may be beautiful. For an item of a particular genre to be beautiful it is not
required that it has a propensity to please anyone who can experience it. But
it must have a propensity to please some of those who can and often have
got pleasure from items of that genre. Let us call those people fans of the
genre.5
3I have in mind political and moral values, for example. I leave open the question
whether the exclusion holds for aesthetic values.
4“Disinterested pleasure” is a Kantian expression, but I doubt that my use of it exactly
coincides with Kant’s use of the German original.
5The claim entails that something beautiful may fail to please a non-fan, not that it
must do so.
Marcus Giaquinto 55
So one factor accounting for differences of aesthetic judgements is sim-
ply that people differ with respect to the genres of things that may affect
them. But even among fans of a particular genre there are differences of
aesthetic judgement about things of that genre. Two other factors may have
role here: differences in cognitive sensitivity, such as in powers of auditory
discrimination, and differences in past attentive experience and education of
the relevant kinds. The last factor, past experience and education, is likely
to be most the important factor explaining differences over time in one’s own
aesthetic judgements about instances of a genre. The cumulative effects of
attentive experience to many instances and of having one’s attention drawn
to differences between instances alters the pleasure one gets from them by
making one more discriminating. Let us say that, relative to a genre, the
fans of that genre with high sensitivity and substantial attentive experience
to and education about things of the genre have a well developed sensibility.
Let us call these fans the connoisseurs of the genre.
Substantial convergence of aesthetic judgements within a genre may be
limited to its connoisseurs, i.e. to the fans of the genre with a well developed
sensibility of the relevant kind. Where there is no convergence of aesthetic
judgements — perhaps the ludicrously named field of conceptual art is an
example — the belief that there are correct and incorrect aesthetic judge-
ments within that field falls under suspicion. But for many genres there is
substantial convergence of aesthetic judgement among connoisseurs of the
given genre, and that makes possible an inter-subjectively validated kind of
correctness.
For these reasons, I propose the following:
A judgement of beauty about something of a particular genre is
correct only if that thing has a propensity to give significant dis-
interested repeatable pleasure to connoisseurs of the genre from
mentally apprehending it.6
That is not a sufficient condition. One reason why not is that there may
be ways of mentally apprehending something which are not the primary in-
tended mode of mentally apprehending it. For example, it is possible for
6There is absolutely no implication here that only connoisseurs of a genre are capable
of appreciating the beauty of an item of that genre.
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suitably trained people to get pleasure from reading the score of some music,
or from reading the text of a play. But if they would not get pleasure from
experiencing performances of the music or play (or from imagining such ex-
periences in aural imagination), any pleasure they get from reading score or
text would not be sufficient grounds for their judging the work to be beauti-
ful. So to get a condition that is sufficient as well as necessary one would have
to add at least that the pleasure in question is to result from apprehending
the work in the primary intended way.
This account, with its reference to genres, works and connoisseurs, does
not deal with aesthetic judgements of natural scenes, hence lacks full gen-
erality. Even confined to judgements of human works, the account is liable
to need amending. But at this point adding further qualifications to rule
out potential counterexamples has diminishing returns. I claim only that the
account is roughly right for the restricted domain of human works, and good
enough to give us bearings for consideration of aesthetic judgements about
mathematical proofs.
2. Ascriptions of beauty to mathematical proofs
There are pleasing visual representations of mathematical entities, but
these are off-topic, as our concern here is with mathematical proofs. There
are some diagrammatic proofs, such as those in Oliver Byrne’s version of
the first six books of Euclid’s Elements [4] and the derivations of Nathaniel
Miller’s [9] formal system of part of Euclidean geometry as illustrated by
his proof of Euclid’s first proposition in Figure 1.7 The latter is a genuinely
visual proof, in the sense that the diagrams cannot be dispensed with: they
are not merely illustrations and they cannot be replaced without changing
the proof.
However, proofs which are described as beautiful by mathematicians are
almost never genuinely visual proofs; some are presented without any di-
agram, and when diagrams do appear, they are usually illustrative aids to
understanding the proof as given in the verbal-symbolic text. So the aesthetic
7This is only a proof of Euclid 1.1 given (a) the rules for obtaining one diagram from
earlier diagrams in a derivation and (b) the intended semantic interpretation of the dia-
grammatic formalism.
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Figure 1: A diagrammatic proof of Euclid’s first proposition.
quality of attendant diagrams is not going to account for mathematicians’
positive aesthetic judgements about proofs.8 But this leaves us with what I
will call the abstractness problem. How can anything as abstract and austere
as a mathematical proof be a genuine candidate for beauty? How can two
proofs of a theorem be compared for aesthetic quality?
One possible answer is negative. One might argue that appraising a proof
as “beautiful” is just loose talk. This would be the case if one said of one proof
that it is “beautiful” (or more “beautiful” than another) for covert reasons
that are not genuinely aesthetic. Many uses of the word “beautiful” are loose.
The game theorist John Nash was described as having “a beautiful mind”;
the actor Philip Seymour Hoffman was described as “a beautiful person in a
8Here I distinguish between a presentation of a proof and the proof itself.
58 Mathematical Proofs: The Beautiful and The Explanatory
hideous world.” In neither case was the judgement genuinely aesthetic: Nash
was praised for his mathematical intelligence and Hoffman for his caring
nature. The word “beautiful” abounds as a general feel-good word, as in
the song “It’s a beautiful world”, expressing a sentiment indistinguishable
from that expressed by the earlier song “It’s a wonderful world”, or the film
title “Life is beautiful” (La vita e` bella). The problem of explaining how
mathematical proofs could be beautiful disappears if we simply accept that
applications of the word “beautiful” to proofs are, in every case, loose uses.
One kind of consideration against this negative view results from a closer
look at the source of the problem, namely, the abstractness of proofs. In
paradigm cases (music, sculpture . . . ) the beauty of an object arises from
the combination of its sensory qualities; we appreciate its aesthetic quality
from our apprehension of it in attentive sense experience. But when it comes
to proofs, sense experience is not germane: the visual appearance of a pre-
sentation of a proof, however pretty, is usually irrelevant to qualities of the
proof itself. The problem then is to say how it is possible for the proof to
have an aesthetic quality. This problem seems acute because we focus on
things whose aesthetic value is governed directly by the quality of our sense
experience in perceiving them.
But if we move away from those paradigm cases, it becomes clear that
sense experience does not always have this all-governing role. The aesthetic
value of a poem partly depends on the sound and rhythm of an aural recita-
tion of it, but only to the extent that it combines effectively with the content
of the poem.9 Even less does the quality of a prose work, such as a short story,
an account of a historical event, or an essay on morals and manners, depend
on the quality of our sense experience in hearing or reading it. In these cases,
the mental apprehension from which we may get aesthetic pleasure consists
in grasping the semantic content of the work, that is, in comprehending it.
When reading a prose work, it is the quality of the non-sensory process of
comprehending it that counts. That is why one can aesthetically appreciate
a novel, for example, from a good translation of it.10 Once we notice that in
some cases aesthetic judgement of a work depends primarily on comprehen-
9This may need refining to deal with poems with non-standard content or without
content, such as Lewis Caroll’s Jabberwocky.
10There is much more to be said about these matters, but this is not the place for
elaboration.
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sion rather than perception or sensory imagination, the supposed problem of
the abstractness of mathematical proofs fades away. A mathematical proof
is, like an essay in morals and manners, an argument, though one without
digressions. We can get pleasure in the process of grasping the argument,
being intellectually sensitive to the way it unfolds, and this can be a proper
basis for aesthetic evaluation. So we are not forced to accept the negative
view that every application of the word “beautiful” to mathematical proofs
is loose talk.
Another kind of consideration against the negative view may arise from
one’s own mathematical experience. We may find ourselves having a feeling
about a proof that properly warrants calling the proof beautiful. To sub-
stantiate this claim, I will present a short proof that has certainly struck
mathematicians that way. It is a proof of a theorem that answers a com-
binatorial problem in geometry. Put concretely, the problem is this. Let
the n walls of a single-floored gallery make a polygon. What is the smallest
number of stationary guards needed to ensure that every point of the gallery
wall can be seen by a guard? If the polygon is convex (all interior angles less
than 180◦), one guard will suffice, as guards may rotate. But if the polygon
is not convex, as in Figure 2, one guard may not be enough.
Figure 2: A non-convex polygon for the gallery problem.
The answer, first proved by Va´clav Chva´tal [5], is this: for a gallery with n
walls, bn/3c guards suffice, where bn/3c is the greatest integer less than or
equal to n/3.11
Here is the admired proof of Chva´tal’s theorem, due to Steve Fisk [6].
11If this does not sound to you sufficiently like a mathematical theorem, it can be
restated as follows: Let S be a subset of the Euclidean plane. For a subset B of S let
us say that B supervises S if and only if for each x ∈ S there is a y ∈ B such that the
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A short argument by mathematical induction shows that every polygon can
be triangulated, i.e. non- crossing edges between non-adjacent vertices (“di-
agonals”) can be added so that the polygon is entirely composed of non-
overlapping triangles. So take any n-sided polygon with a fixed triangulation.
Think of it as a graph, a set of vertices and connected edges, as in Figure 3.
Figure 3: A triangulated non-convex polygon thought of as a graph.
The first part of the proof will show that the graph is 3-colourable, i.e.
every vertex can be coloured with one of just three colours (red, white and
blue, say) so that no edge connects vertices of the same colour.
The argument proceeds by induction on n ≥ 3, the number of vertices.
For n = 3 the statement is trivial. Assume it holds for all k, where
3 ≤ k < n. Let triangulated polygon G have n vertices. Let u and v be any
two vertices connected by diagonal edge uv. The diagonal uv splits G into
two smaller graphs, both containing uv. Give u and v different colours, say
red and white, as in Figure 4.
By the inductive assumption, we may colour each of the smaller graphs with
the three colours so that no edge joins vertices of the same colour, keeping
fixed the colours of u and v. Pasting together the two smaller graphs as
coloured gives us a 3-colouring of the whole graph.
The second and final part of the proof shows that bn/3c or fewer guards
can be placed on vertices so that every triangle is in the view of a guard. Let
b, r and w be the number of vertices coloured blue, red and white respectively.
At least one of these numbers will be no greater than the other two. Suppose
segment xy lies within S. Then the smallest number f(n) such that every set bounded by
a simple n-gon is supervised by a set of f(n) points is at most bn/3c.
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Figure 4: Coloring the vertices of the diagonal uv.
for concreteness that b is: b ≤ r and b ≤ w. Then 2b ≤ r + w and so
3b ≤ b + r + w = n. In other words we have b ≤ n/3 and so b ≤ bn/3c. We
can place a guard on each blue vertex and we are done.
This proof is described as “truly beautiful” by mathematicians Martin
Aigner and Gu¨nter Ziegler in [1, page 232]. I agree that it is beautiful. But
even those who do not, were they to compare it with Chva´tal’s original proof,
would almost certainly regard Fisk’s proof as more beautiful than Chva´tal’s
(though Chva´tal’s is not bad at all). This weighs against the negative view
that any use of the word “beautiful” in connection with mathematical proofs
is just loose talk.
But if it is not loose talk, we should be able to specify some properties
of the proof which we think contribute to its aesthetic merit.12 If we can-
not, the suspicion will lurk that the claim of beauty is just an expression of
pleasure, hence loose talk; but if we can specify properties that we regard
as contributing aesthetically, the claim is less likely to be a mere expression
of pleasure, because by specifying properties we open the claim of beauty
to debate and thereby reveal it to be a judgement that may be corrected or
confirmed by relevant others. I think we can specify contributing properties,
and I will try to do this for Fisk’s proof.
One such property is clarity: the central idea(s) of the proof and its
structure are clear. (Argue by induction on the number of vertices that
any triangulated polygon can be three-coloured; argue arithmetically that a
12But we cannot be sure exactly what (weighted) combination of properties is causally
responsible for the aesthetic pleasure we get in this or any other case.
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colour that occurs no more often than the others occurs at most bn/3c times.)
Clarity is diminished by the use of unintuitive tricks or technical handles, to
use an expression of Manya Raman-Sundstro¨m. It is also diminished by
case-branching, that is, dividing the situation into a number of separate
cases and providing distinct arguments for each case. Case-branching is a
feature of Chva´tal’s proof but not of Fisk’s, which may partly explain the
relative appeal of the latter. The importance of clarity can be appreciated
by contrast with obscurity. The mathematician Hermann Weyl makes the
point as follows [10]:
We are not very pleased when we are forced to accept a mathe-
matical truth by virtue of a complicated chain of formal conclu-
sions and computations, which we traverse blindly, link by link,
feeling our way by touch. We want first an overview of the aim
and the road; we want to understand the idea of the proof, the
deeper context.
Another aesthetically positive property, for which I have no good de-
scriptor, is a combination of brevity and simplicity of methods. This needs
explaining. A proof of a substantial theorem which uses only elementary
methods is liable to be undigestibly long and complicated.13 For a shorter
proof, we use more advanced mathematics, but that may make the proof in-
accessible without a long run up of intensive study. An example of the latter
might be Zagier’s one-sentence proof of Fermat’s Two Squares theorem [11].14
Of course, if you have done the intensive study and internalised the advanced
mathematics, there will be no problem of inaccessibility for you. But even
so, you may feel that the use of advanced techniques is over-heavy for the
theorem proved, and that is an aesthetic matter. So the property I have in
13A proof using only elementary methods may also take longer to find. The proofs of
the prime number theorem using only elementary methods by Selberg and Erdo¨s were
published in 1949, more than fifty years after the proofs of Hadamard and de la Valle´e
Poussin using complex analysis.
14Here is what one mathematician said of this proof. “As a practicing number theo-
rist who has devoted an inordinately large amount of time to polishing various proofs
of the Two Squares Theorem . . . I must say that I have always found the Heath-
Brown/Zagier proof to be both contrived and confusing.” Contribution to Mathoverflow
discussion of Pete L. Clark, July 8, 2010: http://mathoverflow.net/questions/31113/
zagiers-one-sentence-proof-of-fermats-theorem, accessed on January 24, 2016.
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mind is a combination of brevity and simplicity of methods, or an optimal
trade-off between them. But these virtues are relative to the depth of the
theorem. We may feel that a proof of a given theorem is too long-winded
for that theorem or that it uses a sledge-hammer to crack a nut. Perhaps it
is better to say: of two proofs of a given theorem, the one with the better
balance of length and accessibility is preferred to the other, ceteris paribus.
Fisk’s proof of Chva´tal’s theorem has both of these qualities, clarity and
the short-and-simple combination, and on both scores it has the edge over
Chva´tal’s original proof. Fisk’s proof has another property that contributes
to its aesthetic appeal, namely, that it is imaginative, and not an obvious
way to go, given the content of the theorem. This is no less important than
the properties mentioned before, and it is a feature of many proofs described
as beautiful. Here Fisk’s proof does significantly better than Chva´tal’s. (The
way I have presented the comparison, property by property, may be mislead-
ing: it would be a mistake to think that the aesthetic value of a proof is the
sum of values contributed by each property separately; it is rather a function
of the properties in combination.)
Let me summarise. Some mathematical proofs satisfy the necessary con-
dition to be correctly judged beautiful, namely, they have a propensity to
give significant disinterested repeatable pleasure to the connoisseurs of the
genre from mentally apprehending them. We have grounds for this, because
mathematicians do sometimes express such pleasure, by describing a proof as
beautiful. But one may worry that this is just loose talk, because mathemati-
cal proofs are essentially abstract and non-sensory. Against this, prose works
of literature can be strictly and correctly judged to be beautiful, that is, to
have high aesthetic value, even when the pleasure we get from them does not
arise from our sense experience in apprehending them. So the abstractness
of proofs is no bar to aesthetic merit. Secondly, one’s own experience may
provide evidence of a distinctly aesthetic kind of pleasure in grasping a proof.
Fisk’s proof of Chva´tal’s theorem was presented in the hope of eliciting this
kind of feeling. Finally, I specified properties of Fisk’s proof which in com-
bination may reasonably be taken to contribute to its aesthetic value, thus
showing that the claim that it is beautiful is a judgement that is open to
debate, and to correction or confirmation, rather than a mere expression of
pleasure or approval.
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3. Proofs which explain their conclusions
A proof explains its conclusion if and only if anyone who can properly
understand the proof could come to know why its conclusion is true by fol-
lowing the proof. One may wonder whether in the realm of pure mathematics
there is such a state as knowing why a proposition is true, as distinct from
merely knowing that it is true. I will attempt to convince you by presenting
two proofs of Pascal’s Rule. Before that, to show that the idea of coming
to see why a proposition is true is not just a philosopher’s invention, here is
Michael Atiyah, one of the foremost twentieth century mathematicians [2]:
I remember one theorem that I proved and yet I really could not
see why it was true. It worried me for years . . . I kept worrying
about it, and five or six years later I understood why it had to
be true. Then I got an entirely different proof . . . Using quite
different techniques, it was quite clear why it had to be true.
Before presenting the proofs of Pascal’s Rule (far simpler, no doubt, than
Atiyah’s theorem), it will help to make explicit a preliminary argument. Let
n and k be integers, 0 < n and 0 ≤ k ≤ n. To get a sequence of k things
drawn from n things there will be n possible choices for the first component,
n− 1 for the second component, n− 2 possible for the third component, . . .
, and n − (k − 1) for the kth component. So the total number of possible
sequences of k things drawn from n will be
n× (n− 1)× (n− 2)× · · · × (n− (k − 1)) = n!
(n− k)! .
As one can arrange a set of k things into exactly k! sequences, it follows that
the number of sets of k things drawn from n things will be the number of
sequences of k things drawn from n things divided by k!. Using the bracket /
combination notation for the number of sets of k things drawn from n things,
we arrive at this: (
n
k
)
=
n!
k!(n− k)! .
The theorem to be proved is Pascal’s Rule:(
n
k
)
=
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
+
(
n− 1
k
)
.
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Proof 1.
We use the formula for the number of k-membered subsets of an n-membered
set proved above and then apply simple rules such as r(r − 1)! = r!:(
n− 1
k − 1
)
+
(
n− 1
k
)
=
(n− 1)!
(k − 1)!(n− k)! +
(n− 1)!
k!((n− 1)− k)!
=
(n− 1)!k + (n− 1)!(n− k)
k!(n− k)!
=
(n− 1)!(k + (n− k))
k!(n− k)! =
(n− 1)!n
k!(n− k)!
=
n!
k!(n− k)! =
(
n
k
)
.
Proof 2.
Let S be any n-membered set and let α be one of the members. Then each
k-membered subset of S either (i) contains α or (ii) does not contain α.
(i) Each k-membered subset of S containing α contains exactly k − 1
members of S other than α, and there exactly n− 1 of those. So the number
of k-membered subsets of S containing α is equal to the number of (k − 1)-
membered subsets of S\{α}, which equals
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
.
(ii) The number of k-membered subsets of S not containing α is equal to
the number of k-membered subsets of S\{α}, which equals
(
n− 1
k
)
.
So
(
n
k
)
, the number of k-membered subsets of S equals the sum
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
+(
n− 1
k
)
.
Both proofs are clear and easy to understand. But only the second
proof explains its conclusion. The first proof, by using only rules of symbol-
manipulation, reduces the risk of error from combinatorial thinking — this
is the advantage of formal, “syntactic” methods over “semantic” thinking.
But it is only by thinking semantically, in this case thinking in terms of car-
dinalities of sets, rather than proceeding by rules of symbol-manipulation,
that one could come to grasp why the conclusion is true.
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While it is easy to sense the difference between explanatory and non-
explanatory proofs, it is difficult to say what features of a proof will enable
those who understand it to grasp why its conclusion is true. Quite a few
accounts have been offered, but as yet there is little agreement, as one can
see from sections 4, 5 and 6 of Paolo Mancosu’s entry [8] on explanation in
mathematics in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.15 Fortunately for
the concerns of this paper, we do not need a substantive account of what
makes a proof explanatory; we just need to be sensitive to the difference
between proofs which explain their conclusions and those which do not.
4. Do beauty and explanatoriness tend to co-occur?
The expression “tend to” is used here to accommodate the fact that no one
has suggested that the beautiful proofs are exactly the explanatory proofs.
But for the proposition in question to merit investigation and, if true, to be
worth seeking to explain, the hypothesised co-occurrence must be something
stronger than a mere tendency; the thought must be that there is no large
class of proofs which have just one of the two attributes, or that proofs which
have just one of them are very rare, or something similar. This is how I will
read the expression “tend to” in this context.
It will be helpful to factor the question into two and address them in turn:
Do explanatory proofs tend to be beautiful?
Do beautiful proofs tend to be explanatory?
A reason why one might expect a positive answer to the first question is
this. A proof is explanatory only if it can enable a person to grasp why the
fact proved is true by following the proof. That is, the proof must provide
people able to understand the proof both knowledge and understanding of
the fact proved. Getting this understanding is pleasing because it satisfies a
major intellectual desire. (Recall the remarks of Atiyah, cited earlier). So an
explanatory proof can produce pleasure in people with a suitably developed
mathematical mind by their direct intellectual grasp of the proof. Moreover,
it is disinterested pleasure, independent of appetites or instrumental goals.
15For a recent view see Marc Lange’s article “Aspects of Mathematical Explanation” [7]
and his contribution to this special issue of the Journal of Humanistic Mathematics.
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So the necessary condition for a proof to be beautiful seems to be met, if the
proof explains its conclusion.
Precisely because an explanatory proof can provide disinterested pleasure
to people who grasp the proof, it is reasonable to think that its being explana-
tory contributes to its aesthetic value. But something is beautiful, strictly
and literally, only if it has a high or very high degree of aesthetic value. This
is one reason for doubts about the generalisation that explanatory proofs
tend to be beautiful. For in many cases, it would be an exaggeration to
describe an explanatory proof as beautiful. Consider for example the second
proof of Pascal’s rule. While one might prefer it to the first proof, no one to
my knowledge judges it a beautiful proof. In fact there are many explanatory
proofs which are too facile to qualify for this accolade. Here is one of many
explanatory proofs involving diagrams that illustrate the point.
Theorem. For real numbers a and b (a+ b)2 = a2 + 2ab+ b2.
Proof. We use the fact that a rectangle with adjacent sides of lengths y and
z has area yz. Then a square with side length a+b can be decomposed exactly
into a square with side length a plus two rectangles with side lengths a and b
plus a square with side length b, as shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: An argument in terms of areas.
This proof, like the explanatory proof of Pascal’s rule, can be contrasted
with a proof by symbol manipulation of the same theorem, and might be aes-
thetically preferable. But it does not satisfy the condition for being beautiful
given earlier, that it should have a propensity to give significant disinterested
repeatable pleasure to connoisseurs (i.e. to mathematicians, in this context).
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There is a myriad of explanatory proofs, no less elementary, which for
the same reason do not qualify as beautiful. Many of them rely on some
geometrical or quasi-geometrical fact with an obvious spatial aspect. An
example is this familiar proof of the commutativity of addition for positive
integers: mn is the number of dots in an array of m rows of n dots. Rotate
the array through a right angle to get n rows of m dots, making nm dots in
total. As no dots are lost or gained in rotation, mn = nm.
The prevalence of such proofs, explanatory but facile, gives good reason to
doubt the claim that explanatory proofs tend to be beautiful. Can we salvage
something here by making the modified claim that degree of beauty of ex-
planatory proofs is positively correlated with degree of explanatoriness? This
is not going to work, because plain facile proofs of the kind just considered
are no less explanatory than the explanatory proofs which mathematicians
do judge beautiful, such as Fisk’s proof of Chva´tal’s theorem.
Now we consider the proposition that beautiful proofs tend to explain
their conclusions. While this is prima facie plausible, confidence wanes with
exposure to exceptions. I will present an example, modified from [1], the last
of six proofs of the infinity of primes. Let p1, p2, p3, · · · be the sequence of
primes in increasing order. If there is a largest prime pk, the series
∑
1/pn
converges. Euler had proved that the series
∑
1/pn diverges, hence that there
is no largest prime. Erdo˝s found a new proof that
∑
1/pn diverges, described
by the editors as a proof “of compelling beauty” [1, page 5]. A central idea
of that proof can be used to prove the infinity of primes, without reference
to the series
∑
1/pn. Here are a couple of preliminaries (a definition and a
lemma) needed for the proof.
Definition. An integer n > 1 is square-free if and only if it has no square
factor greater than 1.
Notice that an integer greater than 1 is square-free if and only if no prime
occurs more than once in its prime factorisation. For example,
18 = 2× 3× 3 is not square-free.
30 = 2× 3× 5 is square-free.
Lemma. For every n ≥ 1, n = rs2 where r is 1 or square-free and s is
positive.
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Proof. Let n ≥ 1. 12 divides n, and if k2 divides n, k2 ≤ n. So there must
be a maximum positive square, call it s2, that divides n. So for some integer
r, n = rs2.
Suppose r is greater than 1 and not square-free. Then there is a prime p that
occurs more than once in the prime factorisation of r, so that for some integer
j, r = jpp. But then n = j(ps)2 and so s2 would not be the largest square
that divides n, contradicting the definition of s2. So r is 1 or square-free.
Theorem. pi(n), the number of primes less than or equal to n, increases
without bound as n increases.
Proof. Let N ≥ 1. Let rs2 ≤ N , with r square-free or r = 1.
(A) First we seek an upper bound for the number of possibilities for r. If two
numbers have exactly the same primes in their prime factorisations, at least
one of those primes must occur more times in the prime factorisation of one
of the numbers than in the prime factorisation of the other. So one of those
primes occurs at least twice in the prime factorisation of one of the numbers.
So no two square-free numbers have exactly the same primes in their prime
factorisations.
This means that we can define a one-to-one function f on the set
{r | r = 1 or 1 < r ≤ N and r is square-free}
as follows:
f(r) =
{
∅ if r = 1;
{primes in the prime factorisation of r} if 1 < r ≤ N and r is square-free.
Counting the empty set ∅ as a set of primes less than or equal to N , there
are 2pi(N) of sets of primes less than or equal to N . As the mapping f is
one-to-one into the set of sets of primes less than or equal to N , there are at
most 2pi(N) possibilities for r.
(B) Now we seek an upper bound for the number of possibilities for s, where
s is a number such that rs2 ≤ N . Note that if s > √N then s2 > N . So
s ≤ √N . In other words, there are most √N possibilities for s.
(C) Now we make use of these upper bounds, 2pi(N) for r and
√
N for s. The
number of numbers rs2 ≤ N is at most 2pi(N) · √N
As every positive number can be expressed in the form rs2 (by the lemma),
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the number of numbers less than or equal to N of that form is N . So
N ≤ 2pi(N) ·
√
N, which after dividing by
√
N gives
√
N ≤ 2pi(N).
But
√
n increases without bound, as n increases. So pi(n) increases without
bound, as n increases.
This is not exactly the Erdo˝s proof, the proof judged to have compelling
beauty. But it is quite close to the Erdo˝s proof and has much of its aesthetic
value. The main idea and structure of the proof are clear, and its argument
is not an obvious way to go but is imaginative, even ingenious. Moreover,
it is short without relying on heavy machinery. But it does not explain its
conclusion.
Are beautiful but non-explanatory proofs rare? One might be inclined
to think so if most of the aesthetically appealing proofs one has come across
are explanatory proofs. But unless you are a research mathematician the
proofs you have come across will constitute an unrepresentative sample. At
the level of research mathematics a significant proportion of beautiful proofs
may be non-explanatory. The claim that beautiful proofs tend to be ex-
planatory cannot reasonably be accepted without scrutinising a large sample
of beautiful proofs unbiased to the elementary. As far as I am aware, this
has not happened.
5. Conclusions
Mathematical proofs, despite their abstractness, are proper candidates for
aesthetic evaluation and some of them can be correctly judged to be beautiful.
It is widely accepted that some proofs not only prove their conclusions but
also explain them. Often these virtues of a proof, being beautiful and being
explanatory, are found together; it is natural to generalise and think that
proofs that have one of them without the other are rare exceptions. But many
explanatory proofs are too basic to be beautiful; so there is good reason to
doubt that explanatory proofs tend to be beautiful, given a strong reading of
“tend to”. In the other direction, we lack good reason both to doubt and to
believe that beautiful proofs tend to be explanatory. The experience of most
of us is too limited to give us a representative sample of published proofs
from which to draw such general conclusions.
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Those are the conclusions argued for in this paper. Permit me one final
remark. If our interest is in sources of pleasure in mathematical experience,
where that can be the experience of school children, university students,
teachers as well as researchers, our focus on the beautiful is harmfully narrow.
For educational purposes what delights a primary school child is no less
important than what gives pleasure to a professional mathematician. This
entails that we should not overlook proofs and other elements of mathematics
which have an aesthetic value short of beauty. But also, there are non-
aesthetic sources of pleasure, such as surprise resulting from the violation of
expectations. These other sources too are worthy of attention.
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